Research Article

Addressing Conflict-induced Internal Displacement in Nigeria: The Religious Option

Dr. Victor Ifeanyi Ede

Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, Umudike, Abia State Nigeria.

I N F O

A B S T R A C T

This work sought to evaluate internal displacement caused by conflicts in Nigeria with a view to proffering lasting religious solutions to the problem. Internal Displacement in the context of this work means the forceful movement of people from their homes due to religious or political crises, tribal wars, border clashes and insurgency. Findings showed that Nigeria's unprecedented level of internal displacement is a result of five major factors which are flood, government development programmes, ceding of Bakassi Peninsula, *Boko Haram* mayhem and conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen. Conflicts happen to be the major factor responsible for internal displacement in the country. Based on the findings of the study, the researcher recommended religious solutions to the problem. They include; the need for synergy among government, non-governmental organizations and religious organizations in rendering assistance to the IDPs; the need for faith-based organizations to embark on programmes that will lead to peaceful resolution of conflicts in the affected areas. It is believed that if such measures are taken the problem of internal displacement in Nigeria will be properly addressed.

Keywords: Conflict, Displacement, Internal Displacement, Internally Displaced Persons, Religion

Introduction

In recent times there has been the emergence of international and academic concerns to the problem of forced population movement and displacement. Conflicts force people to leave their homes and one of the measures of severity of a conflict in addition to casualties and duration, according to Weiss and Korn (2006) is the extent to which people have been displaced from their communities. The intensity of internal displacement arising from different factors, which include conflicts and natural disasters, has become a global phenomenon. It has emerged as one of the greatest human tragedies of the 21st century. The Norwegian Refugee Council (2009) estimated that at the end of 2008, 26 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were found across the countries of the world. The figure rose to 27 million at the end of 2009 and 27.5 million at the end of 2010. The estimated figure at the end of 2012 was 28.8 million (NRC, 2010, 2011, 2013).

Nigeria is not left out in the problem of internal displacement. There is no doubt that Nigeria is a country made up of an extremely complex web of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. Internal displacement is a common consequence of Nigerian inter-communal and political violence, flooding and forced evictions. In other words, internal displacement of persons could be triggered by natural disasters or human induced conflicts. Irrespective of the cause of the displacement, the phenomenon always leaves a negative socio-economic footprint on those affected.

17

Ede VI
J. Adv. Res. Humani. Social Sci. 2019; 6(1)

Available statistics show that at the end of 2014 there were 3.3 million IDPs in Nigeria as a result of *Boko Haram* attacks, communal and religious violence in the middle belt, flooding, cattle rustling and competitions for resources. From this statistics, Nigeria wasthe home of the largest Internally Displaced Persons in Africa and the third in the world, after Syria (6.5 million) and Columbia (5.7 million) (Ayankola,2015). However, recent statistics released by the UNOCHA shows that as of May, 2016 a total of 2.6 million people have been displaced in the Northern part of Nigeria as a result ofBoko Haram mayhem and communal clashes. The figure of the displaced persons still remained at over 2 million as at June, 2017 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016, 2017). Consequently, the country is faced with the challenge of responding to the needs of the internally displaced population instead of pursuing other developmental projects that can project her strength internationally. There is the need to evolve different ways of addressing this ugly situation in the country. Nigeria, though a secular state, parades an array of citizens who are strong adherents of different religions. Hence, religion is an indispensable factor in all facets of the nation's life and development. There is therefore the need to harness a religious approach in the solution of the problem of internal displacement in the country.

Conflicts and Internal Displacement in Nigeria

In Nigeria, major factors responsible for internal displacement are flood, government development programmes, ceding of Bakassi Peninsula, *Boko Haram* mayhem and conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen. However, conflicts remain the major factor responsible for internal displacement in the country. This is corroborated by Kangiwa and Musa (2015) who observed that;

While environmentally induced causes are also responsible for displacing people, the issue of insecurity continues to be the highest contributor to the number of Internally Displaced Persons in the country owing to activities of insurgents especially in the Northern part of the country (p.1).

Conflicts in Nigeria date back to pre-independent era. Conflicts before independence in Nigeria were as a result of the introduction of various policies by the British administration, like taxation. Notable examples of such conflicts were the 1929 Aba Women riot in the East and the 1916 Iseyin-Okeho uprising in the West (Adesote & Peters, 2015). Early post-colonial era in Nigeria also witnessed violence. Falola *et al.* (1990) noted that the first major ethic violence that occurred in the post-colonial period took place in the Western Region and was between Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola in 1962. The rift between them led to a series of crises and clashes which

invariably led to the declaration of a state of Emergency. According to Olagunju (2006), the Northern region was the second region that experienced another ethnic violence. This took place in Kaduna, the seat of Government and headquarters of the region. This crisis was as a result of the assassination of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the *Sarduana* of Sokoto in a bloody *coup d'état* of January 15, 1966, led by Kaduna Nzeogwu, a person of Igbo ethnic origin. None of the Igbo leaders was assassinated in the *coup* which was said to have created resentment and triggered off a backlash against the Igbo by the Northerners, especially the Hausa. The resultant outcome of this growing resentment led to the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), in which majority of the Igbo were massacred. According to Ibeanu (1998) an estimated two million people died and another ten million were displaced during the civil war. Olukolajo *et al.* (2014) observed that "after the civil war there was relative peace in the country until the 1990s" (p.40).

It is pertinent to note that since the return of democratic rule in Nigeria in May, 1999 violence has continued to persist under different successive administrations. Adesote and Peters (2015) asserted that "since the re-emergence of democracy in May 1999, not less than one hundred politically, ethnically and religiously motivated conflicts have occurred in Nigeria" (p.16). The re-emergence of democracy in Nigeria in May 1999 has lead to a continued rise in conflicts across the six geo-political zones. The conflicts came as a result of various agitations by different interest groups in the country. According to Ayodele (2004), different reasons, which include the weak character of the Nigerian state and the inability of its equally weak institutions to engender order and security, are responsible for these conflicts. Olu-Adeyemi (2012) is of the view that poverty, military intervention in politics, citizens' apathy to the state, elitist greed and manipulation are major reasons for major conflicts and violence. Other major causes of the conflicts include land, space and resource availability, jurisdictional disputes between monarchs, disregard of cultural symbols and pollution of cultural practices (Adeniji, 2003).

Omojeje and Adesote (2011) observed that the first major violence that occurred with the inception of the civilian government in May 1999 took place in the Niger Delta region. The violence in this region was between the local militias and government forces. The local militias emerged during this period as a result of the need to address long years of neglect and deprivation by successive governments (military and civilian) and lack of corporate social responsibility from trans-national oil companies operating in the region. The major violent incidents that occurred in this region with return to civil rule in 1999 led to the displacement of about 60, 000 people during the Odi crises in Bayelsa state (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010).

Ede VI
J. Adv. Res. Humani. Social Sci. 2019; 6(1)

18

The second region that witnessed series of violence following the emergence of democracy in 1999 was the northern region. Conflicts in the northern region have been both inter-ethnic and ethno-religious. In states like Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, inter-ethnic violence erupted, while ethno-religious violence broke out in some other states like Kaduna, Zamfara and Kano (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Dunmoye (2003) in his survey of conflicts in Nigeria, with particular reference to the middle Belt Zone, observed that a major factor of communal conflicts in the zone is land or boundary disputes. He further stated that this shows that land is becoming a very scarce factor of production either due to population pressures, land alienation or concentration of land in few hands. Also, ethno-religious violence broke out in Jos, Plateau state, in 2001. This was between the largely Muslim North and Christian South. More than 1,000 people were killed and thousands of people were displaced (Best, 2011, Human Rights Watch, 2006). Manby (2002) estimated that between 1999 and 2003 more than forty incidents of violence took place nationwide which claimed about 10,000 lives while many were displaced. Prominent among the crises that took place within this period was the *Sharia* crisis.

On February 11, 2000 the Islamic *Sharia* legal system was introduced in Zamfara state. Afterwards there was its subsequent introduction in eleven other States of Northern Nigeria, including Katsina, Kano, Sokoto, Bauchi, Niger, Gombe, Jigawa, Borno, Kebbi, Yobe and Kaduna States. In each case, the introduction of the *Sharia* law was accompanied by controversies which led to series of crises that claimed so many lives and displacement of people.

In the case of Kaduna which is populated perhaps equally by Christians and Muslims, the tension degenerated to very violent conflicts in February and May 2000, that saw to the death of thousands of Muslims and Christians, including a Catholic priest and a legislator (Ehusani, 2002, p. 1).

The riots left at least 3,000 persons dead and led to the displacement of over 63,000 people within Kaduna and its surroundings (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007). These displaced persons sought refuge in the police and army barracks, considered to be the safest places in the heat of the conflicts. Although *Sharia* legal system is an age-long practice among the Muslim population in the state, what triggered the *Sharia* conflicts of 2000 was the impression of the Christian citizens that the action will turn Kaduna State into a Muslim state (Alao & Mavalla, 2016). Between February 2000 and March 2002, similar *Sharia*-related riots erupted in parts of Kaduna, Bauchi, Plateau, Niger and Nasarawa States. The tension generated by the *Sharia* all over the country was such that a quarrel between two people of different faiths (Muslim and Christian) often degenerated to inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict

in which hundreds of lives were lost and property worth millions of Naira were destroyed, while survivors relocated to safer places.

Between 2003 and 2007, a number of violence which could be inter-ethnic, ethno-religious, political and communal featured across the country. There was a renewed violence in Plateau state over indigenes/ settlers issue which led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the state by President Olusegun Obasanjo. He noted that the declaration of state of emergency became necessary due to the unprecedented level of the violence which led to the killing and displacement of hundreds of people (Obasanjo, 2004). Musa Yar'Adua and Good luck Jonathan took over from Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in 2007, following a successful transition. The regime which began in 2007 and ended in May 2011 witnessed various forms of violence which led to the displacement of thousands of people mostly in the northern region.

About the mid 2008, new incidents of post-electoral violence causing displacement were reported, the worst recorded being the inter-communal unrest which erupted in November in the city of Jos. The continuing sectarian violence between people of different faith erupted again in Jos in January, 2010 (Durosaro & Ajiboye, 2011). However, it was reported that the IDPs of both religious groups camped together in mosques, churches, army barracks and hospitals, around Jos city (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2009). About 14,000 IDPs were registered in 13 camps at the beginning of December 2008 by the Nigerian Red Cross (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2012).

In May 2009, thousands of people were displaced as a result of a fight between government forces and militants of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The Joint Task Forces (JTF), charged with restoring order in the Niger Delta, launched Operation Restore Hope in an effort to uproot militant groups. The JTF launched land and air strikes around the city of Warri in Delta State and later extended its offensive to neighbouring Rivers State (Eboh, 2009). About 10,000 people were displaced and were sheltered in schools and hospitals in the local capital Ogbeljoh (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2009).

The emergence and activities of the dreaded Islamic sect popularly known as *Boko Haram* in the Northern Nigeria have been issues of concern to the security of the country. The group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. Yusuf had a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur'an and believed that the creation of Nigeria by British colonialists had imposed a Western and un-Islamic way of life on Muslims. He established a religious complex which included a mosque and an Islamic school which attracted poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. The centre had the

19

Ede VI
J. Adv. Res. Humani. Social Sci. 2019; 6(1)

political goal of creating an Islamic state and became a recruiting ground for jihadists. According to Banjo (2016) Yusuf founded the religious organization in 2002, but Kukah (2015) dated the founding of the organization as 1999. Whichever be the case, it is clear that Mohammed Yusuf founded *Boko Haram* at the beginning of democratic rule which started in 1999. The return of democratic rule in 1999 gave room for people to express their grievances which military dictatorship could not allow.

At the early stage, the group was not violent as Yusuf did not openly preach violence (Kukah, 2015). However, following the attack on the group by the Nigerian security forces in 2009 and the subsequent killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the group turned violent and started unleashing mayhem through bombing of government and religious institutions. Banjo (2016) aptly captured the incidents that led to the violent activities of the *Boko Haram* group thus:

Authorities from a task force known as Operation Flush II in Maiduguri confronted Yusuf's followers in 2009, wounding at least 17 *Boko Haram* members. Yusuf angrily denounced the security forces and called on his followers to rise up against them. In a violent campaign that stretched some five days they attacked police stations and engaged in gun battles before the military brutally cracked down. Yusuf was eventually captured by soldiers and then handed over to police, who shot him dead. Police claimed he tried to escape when they killed him, but witnesses said he was executed. His body was shown on state television and the security forces declared *Boko Haram* finished (p. 2).

Boko Haram re-emerged in 2010 with assassinations and a major raid on a prison more than a year going underground. Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau, who police claimed had been killed in the 2009 uprising, began to appear in videos as the group's new leader. Attacks gradually grew more deadly and sophisticated, particularly with the use of explosives.

The administration of President Good luck Jonathan was troubled by the activities of *Boko Haram* in the northern region. The emergence of President Jonathan in the April, 2011 general election marked a shift of power from the North to the South. This development did not go down well with many political big wigs in the North, some of whom publicly promised to make the country ungovernable for the Jonathan administration (Ajayi, 2012). This resulted to a political crisis (post-election violence) which broke out in some Northern states of Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina which led to the killing of about fifty people including nine Youth Corps Members in Bauchi State (Tukur & Lere, 2012). By the time the crisis ended, the dreaded Islamic sect began to launch formidable and frontal attacks on government security agencies, public institutions, worship centres and symbolic monuments through frequent deployment of bombs and other instruments of mass destruction. In

fact, hardly did any day pass without fresh report(s) of the dastardly activities of this group which virtually brought the country to its knees, security-wise (Ajayi, 2012). Abimbola and Adesote (2012) observed that the activities of this sect have taken different dimensions and trends. The sect has graduated from cruel drive by attacking beer parlours to bombing of security buildings, public buildings and Christian institutions (churches) which happened to be the most affected. Also Olafioye (2013) stated that the *Boko Haram*'s attacks were targeted at churches, mosques, government agencies and security apparatuses, financial and international institutions.

Following a series of attacks carried out by *Boko Haram* in December 2011, in which more than 100 people were killed and some 90,000 displaced, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in some local Government Areas of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (International Crisis Group, 2012). Joda and Olowoselu (2015) outlined major insurgent attacks in North Eastern Nigeria from April 2011 to February 2015 in which the highest attacks occurred in 2014 and 2015. One of the most pathetic attacks was the abduction of over 200 girls from Government Secondary School Chibok, Borno state on 14th April, 2014.

The activities of the *Boko Haram* sect, has increased the displacement of people from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. Hence, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been fleeing to safer havens within the nations and refugees have been fleeing into neighbouring nations like Niger, Chad and Cameroun. According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 2014 report, there has been steady rise in Internally Displaced Persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. From 2009 to 2010 IDPs rose to 100,000 and from 2010 to 2011 it increased to 130, 000. From 2011 to 2012, the number of IDPs rose to 200,000. From 2012-2013 IDPs grew to 290, 000 and from May 2013 to March 2014 it decreased slightly to 250, 000. From May to June 2014, it rose again to 436,608 and from August to December, 2014 IDPs drastically rose to over 600,000 persons (UNOCHA, 2014a). Recent statistics released by the UNOCHA shows that as of May, 2016 a total of 2.6 million people have been displaced in the Northern part of Nigeria mostly due to *Boko Haram* conflict and communal clashes. It has also been noted that majority of these persons constitute women and children (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2014). Despite the claims by the new administration of Muhamadu Buhari that *Boko Haram* has been "technically" defeated; the insurgents are still carrying out attacks on innocent Nigerians, especially in the North-Eastern part of the country (Dara 2016, Adeniyi, 2016).

Another aspect of violence that has led to displacement of people in Nigeria in recent times is the activities of Fulani

Ede VI
J. Adv. Res. Humani. Social Sci. 2019; 6(1)

20

Militia. Inter-communal violence caused by competition between local farming communities and nomadic herdsmen has plagued Nigeria's Middle Belt (Benue, Kaduna, Plateau, Nasarawa and Taraba states) for many years and is spreading to other states (Olade ji,2015). Clashes between local farmers and the Fulani herdsmen have continued to leave a bloody trail, with its attendant destruction of property, farmlands and whole communities. Human Rights Watch (2015) said that more than 1000 people were killed between December 2014 and July 2015 and that in Benue state, more than 100 villages were sacked by suspected Fulani herdsmen in 2012 alone.

In January 2013, Fulani herdsmen attacked some villages in Nasarawa state killing 10 people and displacing over 5,000 people. In a fresh attack of some villages in Nasarawa state about 33 people were killed in November 2014 (Nebie, 2014). More attacks by the armed Fulani herdsmen came in 2016. Duru (2016) reported a gruesome attack on Agatu Local Government Area of Benue state in February 2016 in which about 7,000 people were sacked from six villages by the Fulani herdsmen. Ameh (2016) observed that despite heavy gunshots by the herdsmen, no military or security presence was felt. According to him over 200 persons were killed and houses were razed. In April, 2016 there was a renewed attack on Agatu by the armed herdsmen. Statistics from the Benue state Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) indicated that no fewer than 300 persons died in the renewed violence. According to the statistics, property worth millions of Naira were destroyed while more than 10,000 persons were displaced from the villages in the Local Government Area (Abujah, 2016). In Taraba state, Fulani herdsmen attacked Angai and Ndole villages in Gashak Local Council Area on 11th April, 2016. No fewer than 44 persons were killed while others fled to neighbouring Cameroun Republic and nearby Local Concil Areas (Tsoka, 2016). Uzodinma (2016b) also reported an attack by the Fulani herdsmen in Enugu state in April 2016. The herdsmen attacked Ukpabi Nimbo in Uzo-Uwani Local Government Area on 25th April 2016 killing over 40 people. Survivors fled to neighbouring Communities. Two days after the Ukpabi Nimbo attack, there was another attack by the Fulani herdsmen in Umuchigbo Community in Enugu East Local Government Area of Enugu state (Uzodinma, 2016a). It is very clear that the deadly escapades of arms bearing herdsmen are becoming increasingly unsettling. They have let their footprint in virtually every part of the country. In their latest outings, they have been very unsparing of the communities.

Recommended Religious Approaches for Addressing Internal Displacement in Nigeria

Based on the findings of this research, the researcher recommends the adoption of religious approaches in addressing conflict-induced displacement and its effects in Nigeria. The following recommendations are necessary:

- Government, non-governmental organizations and faith-based organizations should embark on programmes that will lead to peaceful resolution of conflicts in the affected areas. This will help to address the root-cause of displacement which is conflict.
- The financial and logistics requirements for catering for displaced persons especially those in camps are enormous. This calls for synergy among government, non-governmental organizations and religious organizations in rendering assistance to the IDPs.
- Religious organizations should conduct proper need assessment of camps before embarking on humanitarian assistance. This will help in the planning and execution of such projects to achieve the desired results.
- Faith-based organizations should liaise with the government to beef up security in all the Internally Displaced Persons' camps in the country. This will help to avoid incidences of sexual violence, robbery and other security challenges in the camps.
- Government, non-governmental organizations and faith-based organizations should collaborate and establish functional health facilities in various Internally Displaced Persons' camps to cater for the health needs of the IDPs.
- There is also the need for churches and other religious organizations to cooperate with international donor agencies in the provision of humanitarian assistance to the IDPs. This will help in raising enough funds for catering for the needs of the IDPs.
- There should be collaboration among government, non-governmental organizations and faith-based organizations in embarking on real time documentation of IDPs in different camps. This will help to generate reliable data on the number and characteristics of IDPs, which will help in the planning and execution of humanitarian assistance to the IDPs.
- Government should involve religious leaders in trying to address some fundamental issues that affect the development of the country which in turn lead to hostilities and displacement. Problems such as poverty, unemployment and poor infrastructure across the country should be addressed with all seriousness.
- The country should seek for divine intervention to the problem of internal displacement. A day of national prayer should be organized religious leaders to intercede for the nation and her internally displaced citizens.

Conclusion

Internal population displacement has become one of the human tragedies confronting the world today. In Nigeria,

21

Ede VI
J. Adv. Res. Humani. Social Sci. 2019; 6(1)

the causes of displacement are multi-faceted, complex and often overlapping. Displacement has been a major problem and has been largely caused by flood, Government Development Programmes and conflicts. Nigeria is prone to frequent flooding, which led to one of the world's largest displacements caused by a disaster in 2012. Millions of slum-dwellers and other marginalized people have been forcibly evicted from their homes in urban centres as a result of government development programmes. Inter-communal clashes fuelled by ethnic and religious tensions are witnessed on a regular basis throughout the North Central and North Western regions. There is also an increase in *Boko Haram* attacks and abductions mostly in the North Eastern region. These have led to the displacement of millions of Nigerians in recent time. Nigeria is notable for its religiosity, with three major religions, Christianity, Islam and African Traditional Religion, existing side by side. Therefore there is the need to seek for religious approaches in addressing the problem of internal displacement in the country.

References

1. Abimbola JO, Adesote SA. The challenge of domestic terrorism in Nigeria: Issues, trends and the way forward. A paper presented at the 22nd Annual National Conference of Nigerian Society of International Affairs on Contemporary Challenges in Nigeria, Africa and the world. 4th-5th April, 2012 at International Conference Centre, Lead City University, Ibadan. 2012.

2. Abujah R. The aftermath of Agatu communal clash with Fulani herdsmen. Retrieved fromwww.beltnaija.com/2016/04/this-mus...on 28/04/2016.

3. Adeniji A. Conflict management and peaceful co-existence in a democratic and plural society: The Nigerian example. *The Constitution-A Journal of Constitutional Development.* Centre for Constitutionalism and Demilitarization (CENCOD). 2003.

4. Adeniyi W. 24 Army men wounded in Kareto battle with Boko Haram. 2016. Retrievedfrom https://www.Thenews.ng/metro/boko-haram-army...on 28/04/2016.

5. Adesote SA, Peters AO. A historical analysis of violence and internal population displacement in Nigeria's fourth republic, 1999-2011. *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* 2015; 2(3): 13-22.

6. Ajayi G. The travails of democratic governance in Nigeria: A historical perspective. Proceedings of the 4th Annual Conference of school of Arts and Social Sciences, Adeyemi College of Education, Ondo on Socio-political Conflicts and challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. 2012; pp. 1-14.

7. Alao OE, Mavalla AG. Kaduna state *sharia* crisis of 2000: The lessons and challenges after sixteen years. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2016; 21(1): 08-14.

8. Ameh CG. 300 reportedly killed in renewed Agatu crisis. *Dailypost.* 2016. Retrieved from www.dailypost.ng/2016/02/26/300-reportedly-killed-...on 28/04/2016.

9. Ayankola M.Boko haram: Refocusing assistance strategy for IDPs. Punch Newspaper. Editorial Opinion. 2015

10. Ayodele B. The Nigerian state and conflict management in the nascent democratic project. In Agagu AA and Ola RF. (eds) Development agenda of the Nigerian state. Ibadan: FIAG Publishers. 2004.

11. Banjo T. The history of Boko Haram: Here's all you need to know. Retrieved from http://www.nigerianmonitor.com/the-history-of-boko-haram-heres-all-you-need-to- know/ on 15/06/2017.

12. Best SG, Rakodi C. Violent conflict and its aftermath in Jos and Kano, Nigeria: What is the role of religion? Birmingham, U.K.: University of Birmingham Press. 2011.

13. Dara S. Calm returns to Kareto after Boko haram attack. Retrieved from http://www.thenews.Ng/metro/calm-returns...on 28/04/2016.

14. Dunmoye RA. General survey of conflicts in the Middle Belt Zone. Abuja: National War College. *Journal of Centre for Peace Research and Conflict.* 2003.

15. Durosaro IA, Ajiboye SK. Problems and coping strategies of internally displaced adolescents in Jos metropolis, Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2011; 1(20) 256-262.

16. Duru P. 7,000 persons displaced in Fulani herdsmen, Agatu farmers clash in Benue. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/02/7000-persons-displaced.... on 29/04/2016.

17. Eboh C. Nigerian parliament urges wider Niger Delta offensive. 2009. Retrievedfrom http://af.reuters.com/article/nigeriaNews/idAFLm9424...on 22/05/2016.

18. Ehusani G. A brief survey of the sharia crisis in Nigeria. 2002. Retrieved from http://www.georgeehusani.org/home/index.php/papers-and-essays/183-a-brief-survey-of-the-sharia-crisis-in-nigeria on 20/07/2017.

19. Falola T. et al. History of Nigeria 3: Nigeria in the 20th century. Ibadan: Longman Group Limited. 1990.

20. Freccero J. Sheltering displaced persons from sexual and gender-based violence. *Forced Migration Review.* Retrieved fromhttp://www.fmreview.org/dayton20/freccero.html on 30/04/2016.

21. Human Rights Watch. The miss world riots: Continued impunity for killings in Kaduna. 2003. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/07/22/miss-world-riots/continued-...on 22/05/2016.

22. Human Rights Watch. They do not own this place: Government discrimination against non-indigenes in Nigeria. 2006. Retrieved fromhttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/nigeria0406/on 22/05/2016.

23. Human Rights Watch. Nigeria: At least 1,000 civilians

Ede VI
J. Adv. Res. Humani. Social Sci. 2019; 6(1)

22

dead since January. Human Rights Watch Daily Brief. 2015.

24. Hurley SL. Women's right, culture and conflict: Implementing gender policy in Amboko refugee camp, Chad. *(*Master's Thesis), Graduate Programme in Environmental Studies, York University.2012

25. Ibeanu O. Exiles in their own home: Internal population displacement in Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science* 1998; 3(2): 80-97.

26. Integrated Regional Information Network (2009). Nigeria: Thousands flee violence, hundreds suspected dead. Retrieved from http://www.irinnews.org/report/845/2/nigeria-thousands-..on 22/05/2016.

27. Integrated Regional Information Network. *Displaced persons in north east Nigeria.* Retrieved fromhttp: // allafrica.com/stories/200806...htmlon 15/03/2016. 2014.

28. International Displacement Monitoring Centre. Nigeria: Institutional mechanisms fail to address recurrent violence and displacement. Retrieved from www.internal-displacement.org/asset...on 20/04/2016. 2007.

29. International Crises Group.*Crisis watch database*. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?... on 22/05/2016. 20

30. Joda FM, Olowoselu A. Effects of insurgency on girls education in north eastern Nigeria. *European Journal of Education and Development Psychology* 2015: 3(1): 44-50.

31. Kangiwa HS, Musa AI. Text of a Communiqué issued at the end of a 2-day summit on internally displaced persons in Nigeria organized by the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre. August 19-20, 2015 at National Centre for Women Development, Abuja.

32. Kukah MH. Nigerians under the menace of Boko Haram: Some random thoughts. *Encounter Journal of African Life and Religion* 2015; 11: 28-39.

33. Manby B. *Principal human rights challenges in Nigeria.* A Paper Presented at the Conference on Nigeria; Unity, Governance, Law and Conflicts, At Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 2002.

34. Mooney E. *Internal displacement and gender*. A Paper Presented at a Workshop on Child Rights Approach to Complex Emergencies and Internal Displacement, Organized by UNICEF in Brussels. 1998.

35. Muggah R. Conflict-induced displacement and involuntary resettlement in Colombia. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 2003; 13(12): 133-164.

36. Nebie F. Fulani gunmen attacked Nasarawa villagers, killed 33 farmers. 2014. Retrieved from http://naijagist.com/Fulani -gunmen-attack... on 28/04/2016.

37. Norwegian Refugee Council. Nigeria: No end to internal displacement. Geneva: IDMC Global Project. 2009.

38. Norwegian Refugee Council. Internal displacement: Global overview of trends and developments in 2009. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2010.

39. Norwegian Refugee Council. Resolving internal displacement: Prospects for local integration. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2011.

40. Norwegian Refugee Council. Internal displacement: Global overview of trends and developments in 2012. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2013.

41. Obasanjo O. Text of broadcast to the nation on the declaration of a state of emergency in Plateau State. Daily Trust Newspaper. 2014.

42. Oladeji A. Humanitarian crises and internally displaced persons: Addressing the plights of youth and women victims in Nigeria. *Basic Research Journal of Social and Political Sciences* 2015; 3(3): 42-55.

43. Olafioye O. Insurgency: Nigeria's festering scourge. 2006. Retrieved from http://sunnewsonline.com.news/specials/icons/insurgency-nigerians-feste...on 15/03/2016.

44. Olagunju O. *Management of internal displacement*. (Unpublished M.A Thesis) Legal Anthropology, Brandeis University. 2006.

45. Olu-Adeyemi O. The challenges of democratic governance in Nigeria. *International Journal of Business and Social Sciences* 2012; 3(5): 67.

46. Olukolajo MA, Mary A, Matthew T. Crisis induced internal displacement: The implication on real estate investment in Nigeria. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development* 2014; 5(4): 39-48.

47. Omojeje AV, Adesote SA. Resource control conflicts and security in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. *African Journal of Social Research and Development* 2011; 3(2): 101-110.

48. Rushing EJ, Read J. Nigeria: Multiple displacement crises overshadowed by Boko Haram. 2014. Retrieved fromwww.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa-nigeria/2014/nigeria-multiple-displacement-crises-overshadowed-by-boko-haram. on 28/3/2017.

49. Segura-Escobar N, Donny M. Uprootedness, gender and internal displacement in Colombia. Beyond Law. 1997; 6(17): 54-61.

50. Shahid K. Provision of health assistance to internally displaced persons of South Waziristan agency in Camps. *International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research (IJPAMR)* 2014; 2(3): 84-97.

51. Tsoka K. Scores killed in Taraba, as Fulani herdsmen attack villages. 2016. Retrieved from guardian.ng/news/scores-killed-in-taraba-as-...on 28/04/2016.

52. Tukur S, Lere M. Some NYSC members killed in Bauchi were PDP's IT consultants, CPC Spokesman, Fasakin. 2012. Retrieved from www.premiumtimes.com/

23

Ede VI
J. Adv. Res. Humani. Social Sci. 2019; 6(1)

news/11-3299-... on 29/04/2016.

53. UNICEF. Missing Childhoods: The impact of armed conflict on children in Nigeria and beyond. 2015. Retrieved from https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/child-Alert-Missing-childhoods-Embargo-00-01-GMT-13-April.pdf on 19/3/17.

54. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2014a). An overview and response to humanitarian crisis in northern Nigeria. Retrieved from http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/...on 15/03/2016.

55. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Nigeria: Displacement-humanitarian snapshot. 2016. Retrieved from http://unocha.orgon 25/08/2016.

56. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. North-East Nigeria: Humanitarian situation update. 2017. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-humanitarian-situation-update-june-2017 on 25/07/2017.

57. Uzodinma E. Schools shut as Fulani herdsmen launch fresh attack in Enugu community. Retrieved from dailypost.ng/2016/04/27/happening-n... on 28/04/2016.

58. Uzodinma E. Scores killed as herdsmen attack Enugu community, residents flee home. Retrieved fromdailypost.ng/2016/04/25/scores-kill...on 28/04/2016.

59. Weiss TG, Korn DA. Internal displacement: Conceptualization and its consequences. London: Routledge. 2006.

60. Women's Refugee Commission. Gender based violence.2014. Retrieved from http;//www.womensrefugeecommission.org/gbv on 30/04/2016.